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I. INTRODUCTION
During the 1980s, both sides of the hostile takeover controversy viewed proxy
contests in terms that bordered on the mythical. Those made uneasy by the takeover
phenomenon, especially management, held out proxy contests as an alternative,
almost utopian mechanism through which a civilized debate about corporate
strategy and structure could be held. As the Delaware Supreme Court put it, "[ilf
the stockholders are displeased with the actions of their elected representatives [in
* Visiting Henley Professor of Business and Law, Columbia University, and Charles J. Meyers
Professor of Law and Business, Stanford University.
** President, The Gordon Group, Cambridge, MA.
* Associate Professor of Public Policy and Director, Corporate Voting Research Project,
Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. The authors appreciate the helpful comments of
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blocking a hostile takeover], the powers of corporate democracy are at their disposal
to turn the board out."1 In contrast, those who believed that takeovers were neces-
sary to displace inefficient management or otherwise change corporate policy
dismissed the proxy contest as entirely ineffective. They argued that the costs of
collective action arising from dispersed share ownership reduced to allegory the
prospect that the proxy process could provide a viable means to correct management
failure.'
With the benefit of a little hindsight, both views have turned out to be wrong.
Takeover proponents' dismissal of the proxy process ignored the dramatic growth in
the holdings of institutional investors, and the resulting reduction in the costs associ-
ated with collective voting action.' Moreover, takeover proponents' dismissal of the
proxy process seemed to stem from a preference (in the case of financial economists,
often a purely intellectual preference) for market-based, price-driven mechanisms
over ones that created a meaningful, substantive debate over corporate policy.
Indeed, financial scholars often appeared to view the institutional complexity and
substantive, process-driven dynamics associated with proxy contests with unease.4
The inefficiency of proxy contests was often assumed rather than treated as a
hypothesis subject to empirical test.5
Similarly, management's evangelical invocation of the proxy process as an
alternative to hostile takeovers ignored problems with the proxy process itself and
was ultimately revealed to be a strategic smokescreen. State and federal laws
impose substantial barriers to the effective use of the proxy process even when the
pure collective action impediments can be overcome.6 Significantly, once it appeared
that the takeover threat arising from tender offers had subsided and that proxy
1. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 959 (1985); see also Martin Lipton, Take-
overs in the Boardroom, 35 Bus. LAW. 101, 116 (1979) (stating "[i]f the shareholders are dissatisfied
with the directors' rejection of a takeover bid, they have the right, through the normal proxy machinery,
to replace the directors or to instruct directors to accept a takeover bid").
2. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel A. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Manage-
ment in Responding ta Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1171 (1981) (stating "lt]he cry of 'turn
the rascals out' also is not of much use, because other shareholders still find it in their self-interest to be
passive . . . .Each shareholder will recognize that his votes will not effect the outcome unless he has a
large block of shares"). Ronald J. Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against
Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819, 843 (1981) (stating that "[c]orporate law and
economics. combine to make the proxy fight an unattractive displacement mechanism").
3. INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR PROJECT, COLUM. L. SCH., INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS AND CAPITAL
MARKETS: 1991 UPDATE (Sept. 1991) (reporting that as of 1990 institutional investors owned approxi-
mately 53% of outstanding U.S. equities and 54.8% of the outstanding stock of Business Week's 100
largest corporations ranked by stock market value).
4. See, e.g., Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON.
110 (1965); Andrei Schleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Large Shareholders and Corporate Control, 94 J.
POL. ECON. 461 (1986).
5. A few studies make a serious attempt to examine the efficiency of proxy contests. Notable is
Harry DeAngelo & Linda DeAngelo, Managerial Competition, Information Costs and the Governance
of Publicly Held Corporations, 23 J. FIN. 29 (1989).
6. See Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REv. 520, 530-45
(1990) (providing a detailed account of the regulatory barriers to shareholders using the proxy
mechanism).
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contests might be more than myth, the same management groups that had proffered
proxy contests as responsible alternatives to takeovers began erecting barriers to
them. As introduced, the new Pennsylvania antitakeover statute explicitly discour-
aged proxy contests as well as hostile tender offers.' The management of Time, Inc.,
not satisfied with preventing its shareholders from having the opportunity to decide
whether its long-term business strategy was worth more than $200 a share, crafted
the convertible securities issued in connection with the Warner acquisition so that
the equity of common stockholders would be substantially diluted if they had the
temerity to replace as few as five of Time-Warner's twenty-seven directors without
management's permission.8 More recently, when the Securities and Exchange
Commission proposed a number of quite moderate revisions in the proxy rules that
would allow disinterested institutional shareholders to discuss management or third-
party proxy proposals without first filing with the SEC,' business interests converged
on Washington to urge the Secretary of Treasury and Vice-President to rein in the
SEC.' °
In all events, recent history has demythologized proxy contests. There is a
growing recognition that proxy contests are important not because they are the
same as hostile takeovers, a position that animated much of the original reaction to
the resurgence of proxy contests, but because they are different. The idea is that the
choice of a particular technique by which management's control of the levers of
corporate governance is challenged-friendly acquisition, hostile takeover, or proxy
contest-is endogenous. That is, the choice of technique is a function of the goal
sought to be accomplished." The proxy process is different because it can be used to
effect a wide variety of incremental goals in corporate governance without the
massive ownership change inherent in a hostile takeover. To be sure, outsiders can
use proxy contests to displace management; in the mid-1980s many large proxy
contests were undertaken in conjunction with hostile tender offers that had been
frustrated through defensive activities by target management. But in a world of
concentrated institutional share ownership, more narrowly focused proxy initiatives
can be undertaken to pursue a wide variety of less high-stakes (for either side)
activities. Through proxy initiatives, shareholders can attempt to reverse specific
corporate policies, change payout levels, replace specific directors or managers, or
propose alternative long-range strategies for the firm-all efforts that typically
would not require the cost of the change in ownership inherent in a hostile takeover,
The diversity of strategies that can be pursued through the proxy process
7. 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 275 (1991); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Redirecting State Takeover
Laws at Proxy Contests (Sept. 1991) (unpublished manuscript).
8. See Joseph A. Grundfest, The Catch 22 in Time, 6 MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS & CORP.
GOVERNANCE L. REP. 1 (1991).
9. Regulation of Securityholder Communications, Exchange Act Release No. 29,315, [1991
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 84,811 (June 17, 1991).
10. See Stephen Labaton, U.S. Pressed by Business Over S.E.C., N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1991, at
Dl.
11. See Ronald J. Gilson, The Political Ecology of Takeovers: Thoughts on Harmonizing the Euro-
pean Corporate Governance Environment (Oct. 1991) (John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics,
working paper No. 84).
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makes it the natural focus for shareholder initiatives in an institutional environment
characterized by concentrated ownership, and in an economic environment charac-
terized by broad questions of long-run competitiveness. Hostile takeovers, whatever
their merits, are expensive and all or-nothing in their ability to effect corporate
change. Moreover, we seem to be entering an era where the major concern is not the
deconglomerating of businesses through quick asset sales that characterized the
1980s, 2 but rather effecting the resurgence of American industry necessary to
respond to global competitiveness. In this era the need is not so much for the
episodic and confrontational monitoring of the takeover market, but rather for the
continuous and textured monitoring said to characterize the German and Japanese
corporate governance systems. 3 In the United States the proxy process may be the
mechanism of choice, precisely because it lends itself to incremental strategies and
to substantive debates over the future direction of corporate policy.
Expert minority board representation is one method by which institutional
investors and other large shareholders can institutionalize the constructive engage-
ment suited to the problems of the 1990s. In contrast to traditional outside directors,
expert directors proffered by large shareholders should have the time and incentives
to provide ongoing monitoring." It is central to the success of this strategy that
expert directors should comprise a minority of the board. Limiting such representa-
tion to a minority slate assures management that there is no immediate threat of a
change in control, yet assures that a minority of directors have the distance and
incentive to ask hard questions. 5
The moderate nature of the constructive engagement strategy is underscored by
what happens if management and the minority directors disagree. In that event, the
decision-making balance rests with the traditional outside directors, a group that
studies have shown may not be effective in a proactive way, but is quite effective
when a crisis shifts decision making authority and corporate resources to them.' 6 A
disagreement between management and minority directors thus elicits action by
traditional outside directors in precisely the setting in which they have been most
12. See, e.g., Randall Morck et al., Do Managerial Objectives Drive Bad Acquisitions?, 45 J. FIN.
31 (1989); Amar Bhide, The Causes and Consequences of Hostile Takeovers, J. APPLIED CORP. FIN.,
Summer 1989, at 36; Sanjai Bhagat et al., Hostile Takeover in the 1980s: The Return to Corporate
Specialization, in 1990 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY. MICROECONOMIC 1; Robert
Comment & Gregg Jarrell, Corporate Focus and Stock Returns (May 1991) (working paper No. 91-01,
Univ. of Rochester).
13. See JOHN POUND. CORP. VOTING RESEARCH PROJECT, RAIDERS, TARGETS, AND POLITICS:
CHARTING THE NEXT ERA IN AMERICAN CORPORATE CONTROL (Oct. 1991) (John Pound, a former SEC
economist, is director of the Corporate Voting Research Project, at Harvard University's Kennedy School
of Government); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: An
Agenda For Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REV. 863 (1991).
14. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 13, at 883-92.
15. Id. at 888-89. The minority character of the representation should also be important to other
shareholders, who will view the proxy contest quite differently if its goal is to provide an independent
minority voice on the board rather than to change the individuals responsible for running the corpora-
tion's business.
16. See JAY W. LORSCH, PAWNS OR POTENTATES: THE REALITY OF AMERICA'S CORPORATE
BOARDS 98-139 (1989).
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effective.
A minority representation strategy, which we have advocated both in scholar-
ship and through direct corporate action, 17 should be relatively noncontroversial
because it minimizes the threats inherent in the confrontational tactics of the
1980s-the goal is to monitor management, not replace them. And because it
contemplates the constructive engagement of large shareholders in the ongoing
corporate governance process,18 it should meet a more receptive regulatory reception
as well.
At this point the irony which motivates our effort arises. The regulatory
barriers to proposing and electing a minority of directors are dramatically higher
than those confronting a proxy contest seeking to shift control by replacing the
entire board. Precisely because this perverse outcome makes no sense, the regulatory
barriers that cause it stand out starkly. Fortunately, they may be eliminated without
making major-and, what recent experience indicates, controversial-changes in
the proxy rules. Such a project is the best kind of reform, one that promises a large
potential payoff from very little change.
Part I of this Article identifies the regulatory barriers to a proxy campaign
seeking minority representation-the short slate problem and the bona fide nominee
rule. Part II examines the flawed techniques available under the existing regulatory
regime to avoid the problems caused by these barriers. Part III then suggests a
simple amendment to the bona fide nominee rule that would alleviate the special
barriers to electing a minority of directors.
11. SEEKING MINORITY BOARD REPRESENTATION UNDER THE CURRENT PROXY
RULES
Imagine a long-term shareholder concerned about corporate performance or
some aspect of corporate policy, who wishes to nominate director candidates to
inject an alternative point of view into corporate decision-making. The shareholder
does not wish to change control of the board; only minority representation is sought.
Imagine further that management welcomes neither the shareholder's request for
representation nor the proposed candidates, so that merely submitting the nominees
to the board's nominating committee, if it has one, would not result in shareholders
being given the opportunity to vote on the proposed nominees. In other words,
management won't make it easy by including the shareholder's nominees on the
proxy card distributed by the corporation. To succeed, the shareholder must inde-
pendently circulate proxy materials, solicit votes in favor of the minority nominees,
17. Lilli Gordon has developed strategy in four recent proxy campaigns based on minority repre-
sentation. Gilson, Gordon, and Pound were co-sponsors, along with Carl Icahn, of a 1991 initiative to
elect four independent director candidates to USX Corporation's fifteen-member board.
18. For other suggestions that shareholders have the ability to elect their own nominees for a
number of board seats, see, e.g., Louis LOWENSTEIN. SENSE AND NONSENSE IN CORPORATE FINANCE 232
(1991), reprinted in Symposium, Proxy Reform, 17 J. CORP. L. I, 22 (1992) (stating "institutional
investors should be represented on the board by allowing them to nominate a few directors, not just elect
those who have been nominated by management, and without having to fight their way in"); Elmer W.
Johnson, An Insider's Call for Outside Direction, HARV. Bus. REV., Mar.-Apr. 1990, at 46.
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and secure enough votes to win.
At first glance, the process of pursuing minority board representation appears
to be relatively simple. The shareholder must file with the Securities and Exchange
Commission a proxy statement containing the information required by Schedule
14A, together with any supporting materials to be circulated to shareholders and a
proposed proxy card.19 The shareholder must also file Schedule 14B disclosures with
respect to any director candidate who will actually speak with shareholders in
conjunction with the solicitation. 2' After the SEC reviews the filings, the share-
holder may circulate the soliciting materials and proxy card, and pursue the election
of the minority director candidates. 2 1 When the solicitation is completed, the share-
holder then attends the annual shareholder meeting, nominates the proposed
director candidates, and casts the proxy votes that have been acquired in favor of
those candidates. At this surface level of generality, and subject to a relatively high
minimum cost threshold-which deters everyone whose potential to improve the
corporation's governance does not outweigh collective action costs-any shareholder
can nominate, solicit votes for, and elect new minority directors to the corporate
board, provided a sufficient number of shareholders can be persuaded to vote for
them.
The story becomes more complicated, however, under the much more arcane
pattern of state law, corporate charters, and federal proxy rules that govern the
nomination of candidates, solicitation of votes, and election at specific corporations.
Combined, these rules make it quite difficult for interested shareholders to nominate
and successfully elect a slate of directors that is fewer in number than the total
number up for election. Such a slate of directors is termed a "short slate." The next
section provides a description and formal representation of the short slate problem,
and a discussion of how the SEC's bona fide nominee rule prohibits the most
straightforward solution.
A. The Short Slate Problem
The short slate problem is inherent in any majority-rule election in which an
outside shareholder nominates a smaller number of candidates than the total up for
19. Rule 14a-6, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-6 (1991), requires the filing of the proxy statement,
supporting materials, and the proxy card. Rule 14a-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-3 (1991), requires that the
proxy statement contain the information specified in Schedule 14A. Schedule 14A, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-
101 (1991), in turn, specifies such matters as the identity of the persons making the solicitation, the
revocability of the proxy, the methods and cost of solicitation, and a short professional history of the
director nominees and, if incumbents, their compensation.
20. Schedule 14B, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-102 (1991), requires disclosure of the identity and back-
ground of the participant, the participant's interest in the issuer's securities, the nature and extent of the
participant's involvement in the proxy contest and the relationship between the participant and the issuer.
21. Rules 14a-6, 14a-11, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a7, .14al1 (1991), do not require that the participant
receive SEC approval before it may circulate solicitation materials to shareholders. Rather, they mandate
a waiting period-ten business days for proxy materials and two business days for supporting materials
under Rule 14a-6-before distribution to shareholders. However, it would be quite unusual for a party to
distribute its materials, even after the waiting period had expired, without first having received SEC staff
comments. Thus, the waiting period operates much like a de facto approval requirement.
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election. For firms with unclassified boards that re-elect all directors annually, the
problem is not restricted to minority representation; it arises with any slate
comprised of fewer director nominees than there are directors on the full board. 22
The short slate problem is less critical in firms with classified boards. Such firms
elect only a fraction (usually one-third) of directors annually, so that one seeking
only a minority of the total board may often contest all seats up for election and
thereby avoid-the problem. However, the problem does not entirely disappear even
in the presence of a classified board if the company's board is large enough. Time-
Warner's board, for example, consists of twenty-seven individuals classified into
three equal cohorts; each annual election thus involves nine board seats. For a
shareholder who seeks to inject fewer than nine new voices into the boardroom, the
slate will be short even in the presence of the classified board.
Consider the mechanics of soliciting votes for a short slate in opposition to a
management proxy listing a full slate of candidates for the board. To put the matter
in context, assume the company's board is not classified and is comprised of four-
teen incumbent members, each of whom is standing for re-election on a
management slate. Further assume that the outside shareholder has nominated
three candidates for whom votes will be solicited on a separate proxy card. Under
standard corporate voting rules each shareholder is entitled to cast one vote for each
of the director slots on the corporate board for each share held. Each share in our
example thus has fourteen votes. Finally, assume the company does not have cumu-
lative voting so that only one vote can be cast with respect to each of the fourteen
board positions. The fourteen nominees receiving the highest number of votes are
elected.
Now consider the alternatives confronting shareholders deciding how to vote in
this contest. At first glance, it may appear that the shareholders have the same
choices with respect to this short slate contest as they would if all fourteen board
seats were contested: to vote either for all fourteen management nominees, or for
the three-member dissident slate. However, the presence of the short slate presents a
third possibility: shareholders may vote for the dissident's three-person short slate,
and also vote for eleven of management's fourteen nominees. Through this strategy,
shareholders can cast votes for all fourteen positions, and still support the dissident
slate.
There are several reasons why shareholders who support the dissident slate are
likely to take the third option and vote a "split ticket" in a minority representation
campaign. First, such a voting strategy is consistent with the broad tenor of such
campaigns. The point of offering candidates for only a minority of board seats is not
to challenge the entire board. Shareholders who vote only for the short slate are
effectively voting against all fourteen of management's candidates, as well as
supporting the three candidates sponsored by the dissident shareholder. This voting
strategy turns what is intended to be a mixed message-constructive engagement
22. Nonetheless, the primary impact of the short slate problem falls on one seeking minority repre-
sentation. If control is sought, there is little difference between contesting a majority of board seats and
contesting all seats.
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but no change in control-into a "no" vote on the entire management slate. Second,
by not voting at all for the other eleven director positions, the shareholder is fore-
going the opportunity to indicate preferences among management's fourteen
candidates. Even if the dissident slate is elected, so will eleven of management's
candidates, with some being more qualified than others. Shareholders may conclude
that voting only for the dissident candidates excludes them from a central focus of
the election-deciding who will comprise a majority of the board.
It is at this point that the short slate problem emerges. If a significant fraction
of all shareholders elect to split their votes, then the dissident's short slate is in
serious trouble.23 Suppose that 30 % of the shareholders vote only for the short slate,
40% of the shareholders vote a straight management ticket, and the remaining
30% of the shareholders take the third option and split their votes, supporting the
full dissident slate and eleven out of the fourteen management candidates. Suppose
further that, in the aggregate, shareholders who split their votes select eleven candi-
dates from among management's fourteen on a random basis-that is, such
shareholders as a group do not favor any particular director, but allocate their votes
across all fourteen management candidates with equal frequency.
A plausible first reaction might be that the dissident's short slate would prevail
on these assumptions. Each of the three dissident nominees would receive the votes
of 60% of the shareholders. The logic is that all three nominees, each having
received more than a majority, would win seats on the board. In fact, all three
dissident candidates would lose. Each dissident candidate would receive 60% of the
vote, representing the combined votes of shareholders who support only the short
slate and those who split their vote. However, management candidates also would
receive votes from two groups of shareholders: the 30% of shareholders who support
the dissident slate by voting a split ticket and who, as a group, vote randomly for
eleven of management's fourteen candidates; and the 40% of shareholders who vote
for all fourteen management candidates. The per candidate pro-management vote
from the ticket-splitting shareholders vote would be 0.3 (the percent splitting their
vote) multiplied by 1 1/14 (the average number of votes each ticket-splitting share-
holder would cast for each management-sponsored candidate), or 23% for each
management candidate. Each management candidate thus would receive 63% of
the vote and the short slate nominees, who each receive only 60% of the vote, would
lose.
This is an unexpectedly perverse aspect of the short slate phenomenon. We tend
to think that majority voting rules are simple and straightforward, and that in any
election one candidate will receive a majority and win, and the other a minority and
lose. This is not the case in corporate elections with short slates because corporate
voting rules give shareholders the right to vote for each director slot rather than a
choice between a single "dissident" and a single "management" candidate. Short
slates open up the possibility that both sides' director candidates will receive more
23. There is also a second procedural problem which relates to proxy revocation. Splitting proxy
votes requires returning two proxy cards-one to management and one to the dissidents. The later card
may invalidate the earlier one. See infra note 34 and accompanying text.
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than a majority, and that a dissident's campaign to attain minority representation
will fail despite having received a majority of votes.
This example is easily generalized. The following model is useful for broad
analytic purposes because it allows analysis of a wide variety of potential voting
outcomes with respect to short slates.
Let:
N = the number of board positions up for election;
Nd = the number of seats for which the dissident is running candidates;
Vd = the percentage of shares voted only for the dissident short slate;
V, = the percentage of shares voted for the dissident slate but also for N-Nd
management candidates (a split ticket);
Vm = the percentage of shares voted only for the management slate.
Assume, as in the previous example, that ticket-splitters distribute their votes
randomly across management nominees. Of course, this is not a description of any
individual shareholder's decision-making, but rather a characterization of their
behavior in the aggregate, given that they will tend to vote for different director
candidates.
The vote outcome is as follows.
Dissident nominees receive: Vd + V,
Management nominees receive: Vm + Vs [(N-Nd)/N]
Table 1 below provides examples of outcomes in short slate election contests that
differ across all four dimensions reflected in the formula: the percentage of director
slots up for election that the dissident is seeking, the percentage of shares voted only
for the dissident short slate, the percentage of shares voted only for the management
slate, and the percentage of shares voted for a split ticket. In each case, the outcome
of the vote clearly conflicts with the fact that the majority of shareholders prefer the
election of the dissident nominees and some combination of management nominees
to the election of management nominees alone.
Consider Case 1 in the Table. Here the dissident shareholder seeks to elect only
a very small percentage of the board; this can be interpreted as the prototypical case
in which the dissident seeks to gain only one seat on a 12-to-14 member board for
the purpose of injecting a different opinion into corporate decision-making. Share-
holders have responded to the dissident's proposal by registering overwhelming
support-90%-for his director candidate. Concurrently, almost all shareholders
have also chosen to vote for management candidates. This is entirely consistent with
the spirit of a minority campaign where the dissident is seeking only a voice on the
board. Shareholders would not want to throw away their remaining votes or repu-
diate the entire management slate. Rather, they would support some management-
sponsored directors along with the dissident's proposal for minority representation.
In Case 1, only 10% of the shares do not support the dissident candidate and
are voted exclusively for management nominees; fully 90% of the shares are voted
for the dissident's director candidate. The result, remarkably, is that the dissident
director candidate receives the votes of 90% of all shares, but still loses.
The example depicted in Case 4 of the Table represents the other end of the
1991]
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spectrum in terms of goals and outcome. In this example, the dissident seeks 50%
of the board-not control, but an equal voice with management. This clearly repre-
sents the limit of minority representation, as opposed to a contest for actual control.
The dissident receives the voting support of a majority-51 %--of the shares. In
keeping with the more strongly "either/or" message inherent in a 50% representa-
tion campaign, only slightly over 7 % of the shares (15 % of all shares voted for the
dissident) are also voted for a split ticket.
The dissident loses in this example too. Once again, the contravention of share-
holder preferences is quite remarkable. Fifty-one percent of all shareholders
indicated their preference that the dissident be given half the board, presumably
because of the need to impose a check on management's current policies. Yet that
clear message is defeated in the voting outcome. Management retains full control of
the board," and the dissident receives not a single seat, despite receiving the support
of a majority of shares.
The remaining two cases in the Table reflect intermediate cases between these
extremes. Both embody the same contradiction as the more extreme cases. In every
case, the dissident loses, despite a voting pattern that unambiguously signals share-
holder support for the dissident's campaign.
Table 1
Percent Percent Percent Percent Percent Percent Dissident
of of Shares of Shares of of Shares of Shares Wins?
Director Voted Voted Shares Voted for Voted for
Slots Only for Only for Voted for Dissident Each
Contested Mgmt. Dissident a Split Slate Mgmt.
by Slate Slate Ticket Nominee
Dissident
Nd/N Vm Vd V, Vd + V, Vm + V,
[(N-Nd)/NI
Case 1 7% 10% 3.6% 86.4% 90% 90.4% No
Case 2 20% 25% 11.25% 63.75% 75% 76% No
Case 3 30% 40% 15% 45% 60% 71.5% No
Case 4 50% 49% 43.35% 7.65% 51% 52.85% No
B. The Bona Fide Nominee Rule
There is an easy and straightforward'solution to the short slate problem. The
problem occurs because, as a group, ticket splitting shareholders allocate their votes
across all management candidates, in our original example voting randomly for
eleven of the fourteen incumbent nominees, rather than voting for eleven specific
incumbents. The obvious solution is for the dissident to run a full slate, rather than
a short slate, of directors. The full slate would consist of the dissident's own three
nominees, and the eleven management nominees that the dissident believed were
best qualified to continue to serve on the board. Such a slate would offer share-
holders a voting choice that is superior in virtually every way to that available in a
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pure short slate campaign. Shareholders would be offered two coherent alternatives
on the composition of the board of directors, each of which was fully described and
without uncertainty. These choices would allow the dissident to take a positive posi-
tion on the qualifications and relative expertise of management's nominees, and
create a less polarized set of alternatives.
Most importantly, the perverse outcome observed in each of the short slate
cases-all dissident nominees losing despite receiving a majority of the vote-would
not occur. As in the original example, the dissident's slate would still receive 60% of
the vote. The difference is in the votes received by the incumbents. The eleven
incumbents listed on both the dissident and the management slate each receive
100% of the vote cast (from the 40% of shareholders who vote a straight manage-
ment ticket and the 60% who now vote a split ticket). 2' The remaining three
incumbents, however, receive only 40% of the vote-the votes cast for the straight
management ticket. Thus, the three dissident nominees are now elected, beating the
three targeted management nominees 60% to 40%.
The different outcome results from the fact that the votes of those supporting
the dissidents by voting a split ticket are concentrated on eleven management nomi-
nees, rather than spread randomly (in the aggregate) across all fourteen members of
the management slate. Running a full slate of which only three nominees are dissi-
dents solves the short slate problem by focusing the attention of the ticket spitters.
The same result occurs for each case shown in Table 1. The management nominees
left off the dissident's full slate receive only the votes of those who voted the straight
management ticket and therefore lose to the dissident candidates.
It is here that the micro-structure of the SEC's proxy rules come into play to
block this straightforward solution. A dissident cannot run such a full slate, because
the proxy rules prohibit a dissident from circulating a proxy card that includes any
of management's nominees. In particular, the "bona fide nominee" rule prohibits a
party from soliciting a proxy for director candidates who have not agreed to allow
that party to use their names.2" Under this rule, management simply needs to
instruct its director candidates to refuse to allow their names to be listed on the
dissident proxy. This leaves a dissident who had wanted to pursue a strategy of
constructive engagement with two relatively unattractive choices: either run a short
slate campaign, with all its attendant strategic problems, or run a full slate,
composed entirely of dissident nominees, thereby turning a strategy of constructive
engagement into a full scale control contest. A regulatory structure that mandates
24. The 60% ticket-splitters in this example are comprised of the two groups who supported the
dissident nominees in the original formulation of the examples: the 30% who voted for both the three
dissident nominees and the II management nominees; and the 30% who voted only for the dissident
nominees.
25. The "bona fide" nominee rule appears in Rule 14a-4(d), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4(d) (1991),
which provides, in pertinent part:
No proxy shall confer authority (I) to vote for any person to any office for which a bona
fide nominee is not named in the proxy statement . . . . A person shall not be deemed to
be a bona fide nominee and he shall not be named as such unless he has consented to being
named in the proxy statement and to serve if elected.
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such a counter-intuitive result-encouraging confrontation by restricting cooperative
initiatives-should be supported by a powerful justification. We are unable to
discover or devise one.
The bona fide nominee rule provides an interesting example of a SEC require-
ment whose conceptual explanation fails to justify its perverse impact on
shareholder efforts to elect a minority of directors. Our best conjecture concerning
the rule's goal is to prevent dissidents (or management) from running dummy
director candidates. Conceivably, opportunistic managers or challengers might seek
to mislead voters by placing director candidates on their proxy who had not assented
or did not intend to serve. One possible ploy involves using "big names" to secure a
vote, then announcing after the vote that these individuals had refused to serve or
had resigned and would be replaced, presumably by cronies.26 To be sure, no solic-
iting party should be allowed to ask shareholders to vote for individuals who had not
assented, or indeed had refused, to serve. However, the bona fide nominee rule is
unnecessary to prevent such a scheme. Rule 14a-9 independently prohibits false or
misleading proxy solicitations2" and it is hard to imagine a more misleading solicita-
tion than one for a make believe candidate.
Alternatively, one might seek to justify the requirement that a nominee consent
to a solicitation on his or her behalf not because the nominee is make-believe, but
because the nominee will decline to serve as a director if the dissident nominees also
are elected. But this justification of the bona fide nominee rule also seems beside the
point. Recall that the rule requires a nominee to consent "to serve if elected." Thus,
management nominees who took the position that they would not serve on the same
board as dissident nominees if both were elected would themselves not satisfy the
bona fide nominee rule.
2 8
26. The allegations considered in In re Charles A. Massie, Exchange Act Release No. 3944, [1945-
47 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 75,771 (Apr. 12, 1947), represent the extreme version of
such a ploy. The SEC charged that as part of a scheme to divide control of a company, two parties
agreed that one would name seven board candidates and the other would name six, but with the former
securing in advance the undated resignation of one of his seven candidates. After the election, the resig-
nation would be used and the remaining 12 directors would fill the vacancy. The claim was that the
candidate who had already submitted a resignation was not a bona fide nominee.
Aegis Corp. v. Goldman, 523 F. Supp. 1273 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), is a more recent example of this
phenomenon. In Aegis, a large shareholder had solicited proxies to be voted against a management spon-
sored stock option plan and also had secured discretionary authority to vote the proxies with respect to
unanticipated matters. Id. at 1274-75. At the last moment the shareholder decided to seek control of the
company and at the shareholders' meeting intended to vote the proxies in favor of his own motion to
increase the size of the board of directors. Id. He would then vote only his own shares for his nominees to
fill the newly created vacancies. Because the shareholder had not solicited proxies on behalf of bona fide
nominees for the newly created vacancies, his proxies could not be voted for this purpose. Id. The share-
holder's nominees nonetheless would be elected because the proxies held by management could not be
voted for additional nominees for the same reason. Id. The court collapsed the shareholder's two step
plan, holding that the shareholder's voting the proxies in favor of expanding the board had the inevitable
effect of electing persons who had not been named as bona fide nominees in the shareholder's proxy
statement. Id. at 1279-80.
27. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9(a) (1991).
28. See infra text accompanying note 38.
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That the application of the bona fide nominee rule to prevent dissidents from
listing management nominees on their proxy card is without justification is the good
news. The bad news is that the application has a significant, damaging, and presum-
ably unintended consequence. It prevents shareholders who are seeking to elect a
minority of directors from soliciting proxies for management nominees who are very
clearly bona fide in that they have consented to be nominated for the board, and
who have not stated that they would decline to serve if the minority of dissident
candidates were also elected. 29 These individuals ought to be fair game on anyone's
proxy, which, after all, simply functions as an absentee ballot for a corporate elec-
tion. Moreover, sensible public policy should dictate precisely this result. As applied,
the bona fide nominee rule has the perverse effect of encouraging contests for
control of the board rather than encouraging efforts by dissidents to constructively
engage management.
Two'categories of corporations do not present the barriers to constructive
engagement created by the interaction of the short slate problem and the bona fide
nominee rule. The first category is corporations that have cumulative voting, which
was once widespread but is now a diminishing phenomenon under changing state
laws and corporate charters."°
Under cumulative voting, shareholders may cast for each share held as many
votes as there are director slots up for election, distributing their votes over the slots
as the shareholder wishes, including, in the extreme, casting all votes for a single
candidate. Thus, in the original example having three dissident nominees with four-
teen director slots up for election, cumulative voting allows shareholders to elect the
dissident nominees by dividing all fourteen votes among just the dissident nominees.
If the ticket-splitting shareholders in the original example acted under cumulative
voting rules and divided all their votes among only the three dissident nominees, the
three dissident nominees would be elected along with eleven management nominees.
The second, and more interesting, category is corporations with classified
boards. In recent years, board classification proposals have become a familiar
element of management's array of anti-takeover devices."1 The idea is simply that if
the board is divided into three classes with three year terms, one of which is elected
annually, a raider will need two elections to replace a majority of the board.3 2 Ironi-
cally, management's effort to protect against a hostile takeover serves to make the
corporation more congenial to a constructive engagement strategy. So long as the
29. Management would not urge its nominees to take this position even if the bona fide nominee
rule allowed it. If the dissident nominees were elected, the result would be to turn over complete control
of the corporation to the dissidents. The successful dissident nominees would then be in a position to fill
the vacancies created by the management nominees who declined to serve. See infra text accompanying
note 39.
30. See Sanjai Bhagat & James Brickley, Cumulative Voting: The Value of Minority Shareholder
Voting Rights, 27 J.L. & ECON. 339, 343-44 (1984).
31. For evidence on the prevalence of classified boards, see INv. RESP. RES. CTR.. DIRECTORY OF
TAK9OVER DEFENSES (1991) (stating that about / of publicly traded corporations have classified
boards).
32. Under Delaware law, directors on a classified board can be removed only for cause. DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 141(k)(i) (1991).
1991]
The Journal of Corporation Law
board is small enough, a dissident may seek minority representation by nominating
a full slate with respect to the class of directors being elected in any one year. In
the end, this may constitute the best argument in favor of classified boards. Classi-
fied boards at least create the strategic possibility of incremental change based on
minority representation, rather than sudden and complete shifts in the entire compo-
sition of the board.
III. LIVING WITH THE PROBLEM: PARTIAL CURES UNDER THE CURRENT RULES
A number of partial solutions to the short slate problem are possible under the
current proxy rules, all of which have been observed in recent proxy seasons. Unfor-
tunately, all of them still subject a shareholder pursuing a strategy of constructive
engagement to a perverse regulatory disadvantage compared to launching a proxy
fight for complete control. Thus, they are poor substitutes for the simple reform of
the proxy rules that is necessary to fully solve the problem. We describe these
partial solutions in this part both to contrast them to the real reform proposed in the
next part and, in the meantime, to call them to the attention of any shareholders
who may be contemplating running minority slates in the period before the SEC
corrects the regulatory problem once and for all.
A. Run Against Specific Management Candidates: A "Quasi-Full Slate"
Strategy
A first alternative open to dissidents pursuing a short slate constructive engage-
ment strategy is to persuade ticket splitting shareholders to mark management's
proxy card in a specified way. In our earlier textual example, shareholders should
vote for eleven specific management nominees, and should withhold their vote from
three specific management nominees. If ticket-splitting shareholders follow this
advice, the short slate problem does not arise because the three targeted manage-
ment nominees receive votes only from shareholders voting a straight management
slate and do not receive a share of the ticket splitters' votes-the core of the short
slate problem. Therefore, in our original example, the result is the same as if the
dissident ran a full slate composed of three dissident candidates and eleven manage-
ment candidates. In both cases, the dissident elects three nominees. The three
management candidates deemed least qualified will receive fewer votes than the
other management candidates, and fewer votes than the minority slate.
Three serious problems exist with running a "quasi-full slate" campaign. First,
it emphasizes "negative campaigning" directed at specific individuals in the context
of a strategy intended to stress constructive engagement rather than conflict. To
convince shareholders to withhold their votes from particular management candi-
dates, the dissident must devote considerable time and effort to demonstrating that
the minority of dissident candidates are qualified and that specific management
candidates are not. Such a campaign opens the dissident to the charge of personal
attack, and allows management to shift the debate from the need for a new, albeit,
minority perspective in the boardroom to whether the targeted management candi-
dates are "bad" directors. In addition, attempts to discredit specific management
nominees are likely to attract significant SEC staff scrutiny, and invite litigation,
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because of Rule 14a-9's direct admonitions against character attacks in proxy
campaigns. 3
A second problem with running a "quasi-full slate" campaign by opposing
specific management nominees is complexity. Such a campaign must convince busy
and relatively uninformed shareholders to make a very specific and mechanically
complex set of voting decisions. They must first vote for the dissident slate on the
dissident's proxy card. Then on management's proxy card they must vote for certain
members of management's slate and withhold their votes with respect to the specific
management candidates the dissident has targeted. Ticket splitting shareholders
have a number of ways to make mistakes. They may simply forget for which
management nominees they are not supposed to vote. Or they may mistakenly vote
for too many management candidates, thereby casting too many votes overall. In
our original example, ticket splitting shareholders might support the dissident's
short slate of three, but vote for twelve rather than eleven management nominees
whether through mechanical error or because they failed to understand the conse-
quences of not withholding their vote from all of the targeted management
candidates. In that event, both proxies-the dissident card and the management
card-would be invalid because the shareholder cast votes for more than fifteen
directors.
The third problem is a procedural one relating to proxy revocation. In order to
split their votes between a management's full slate and a dissident's short slate,
shareholders must send back two proxy cards-one to management, and one to
dissidents. This immediately creates a problem because, as a matter of practice,
proxies are written so that a later-dated proxy card automatically revokes, in full,
an earlier-dated card. Thus, suppose that a shareholder signs proxy card with
respect to a eleven management directors on Tuesday, and signs a proxy card with
respect to voting for the three dissident candidates on Wednesday. By executing the
dissident proxy, the eleven management votes are automatically revoked. This
problem can potentially be overcome. However, the solutions are awkward, error
prone, and may create additional problems themselves.3"
Our experience in proxy contests suggests that it is difficult enough to ensure
that shareholders properly fill out and return one proxy card with no choices. The
complications associated with a "quasi-full slate" campaign are a serious barrier to
success.
B. Partial Revocation
Partial revocation is an alternative to the quasi-full slate strategy that allows
dissidents to specify those specific management nominees for whom ticket splitters
33. The note to Rule 14a-9, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1991), highlights as an example of what may
be misleading: "Material which directly or indirectly impugns character, integrity or personal integrity."
34. One might date both the management and dissident proxies identically. However, we have been
told by attorneys who have investigated this tack that the SEC staff has suggested that the two proxies
would have to be accompanied by a letter stating that the shareholder intended both proxies to be valid,
lest each party argue that the other's proxy was a mistake.
1991]
The Journal of Corporation Law
should not vote, with less chance of mechanical mistake due to the unavoidable use
of two proxy cards. In a partial revocation campaign, the dissident's proxy card lists
the minority slate, and also contains a separate box that, if checked, revokes a
shareholder's management proxy for certain specific directors.3 6 The dissident's card
thus accomplishes two goals simultaneously: it solicits votes for the dissident's nomi-
nees, and results in withholding votes for specific management-sponsored directors
equal in number to the number of dissident nominees. Of equal importance, the
partial revocation strategy significantly reduces the potential for shareholders to
make mistakes that would result in the voiding of all of their votes, including those
for the dissident nominees. As long as a shareholder votes for all of management's
nominees, all of the dissident nominees, and checks the revocation box on the dissi-
dent card, the vote comes out correctly without the shareholder having to remember
which of the management nominees have been targeted. To our knowledge, partial
revocation cards were first used in a dissident campaign at Zenith in the spring of
1990.36
Partial revocation campaigns are clearly preferable to pure run-against
campaigns, and are at least a short-term improvement over a quasi-full slate
strategy. However, partial revocation campaigns still present two serious problems.
First, the campaign remains negative in character, and in that respect is inconsistent
with a goal of constructive engagement. Second, and more importantly, the partial
revocation approach invites a similar strategic response by management. For
example, management may follow the dissident's partial revocation solicitation with
its own solicitation that revokes the dissident's partial revocation card. A Suessean
cycle of partial-partial revocation proxy cards may then ensue, whose complexity
and chronology will mystify the most sophisticated proxy solicitor, let alone rela-
tively uninformed shareholders and inspectors of election. The first use of the partial
revocation concept in the Zenith contest had the advantage of strategic surprise. As
the technique becomes more familiar, it will be anticipated by management plan-
ners and a series of clever defenses will once again substitute strategic gaming for
process. In the end, clever gimmicks have a short life span.
C. Expand the Board
A different kind of alternative to an explicit campaign to replace specific
management directors is to seek to expand the board and add new nominees.
Ideally, such a strategy would have the additional benefit of avoiding a negative
orientation because no incumbent directors would be targeted for replacement.
Instead, the result would be only the addition of skills and perspective to the board.
35. In theory, one could solicit an irrevocable proxy. These are uncommon in practice, presumably
because shareholders would be reluctant to give up their ability to change their votes later in the
campaign in response to new information.
36. Nycor, the dissident shareholder, prepared a proxy card by which shareholders could support
its three nominees for Zenith's ten-member board. That card contained a box which, if checked, would
revoke any previously-signed management proxy only as it pertained to three specific directors. Two of
the authors advised the dissident in connection with the development of this strategy.
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Unfortunately, board expansion campaigns are also subject to serious strategic
shortcomings. Most important, board expansion is simply impossible at many corpo-
rations because bylaw provisions prohibit shareholders from determining board size.
In addition, expansion campaigns, like a partial revocation strategy, are also subject
to strategic gaming by management. For example, a shareholder proposing to
expand the board by three members may be met with a management slate
containing three new nominees to oppose the three dissident expansion candidates.
Once again, the dissident would be forced into a "run-against" posture. Therefore,
while a board expansion strategy is an attractive possibility in certain restricted
circumstances, strategic uncertainty and widespread prohibitions on shareholder's
ability to change board size make it a very limited tool.
D. Precatory Proposals
Submitting precatory shareholder proposals urging management to change
board size, composition, or representation is an additional alternatives at many large
corporations with concentrated institutional ownership. In the increasingly
politicized world of institutional voting, management is in the end likely to endorse
any proposal approved by shareholders, both to avoid the stigma of losing in the
implicitly threatened non-precatory campaign that will be pursued if management
ignores the precatory resolution, and to retain some influence over the actual
outcome. Moreover, some institutional investors may prefer a precatory proposal to
a mandatory contest because it allows them to pressure management as a group
without actually voting against specific management candidates. Two of the authors
developed several such precatory proposals for dissident shareholders last proxy
season. One such proposal urged that the dissident-a 15% shareholder-be
allowed to appoint two directors to the board whose seats would vanish if the dissi-
dent sold his stake. 
7
The strength of the precatory approach is also its weakness. As an advisory
proposal, it can be ignored by a recalcitrant management. In addition, the political
sophistication of voters in all but the largest corporations may not be sufficient as
yet to allow this approach to succeed. Similar to the other responses to the short
slate problem canvassed in this Part, precatory proposals are at best an imperfect
approach to offering shareholders a true alternative kind of board representation.
IV. PATHS TO REFORM
The clearest and most direct way to address the short slate problem and to ease
the strategic difficulties associated with short slate campaigns is to reform the bona
fide nominee rule. In this Part, we describe a simple amendment to Rule 14a-4(d)
that solves this problem.
We propose that the bona fide nominee rule be narrowed to prohibit solicitation
of proxies only with respect to director candidates who have not consented either to
37. This proposal was made by dissident investor Harold Simmons in his second proxy contest at
Lockheed in 1991. One of the authors (Lilli Gordon) assisted in developing the proposal.
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being named in the proxy statement of any soliciting party or to serve as a director
if elected. The change allows a candidate's name to be included on the proxy card of
any soliciting party-not just the party who proposes to nominate the candidate. As
a result, dissidents seeking to elect a minority of directors could form a full director
slate simply by adding those management sponsored nominees who they believed to
be best qualified to the list of the dissident nominees on their proxy card. Share-
holders could then vote for a full slate of directors on a single proxy card. The short
slate problem would be solved without introducing the mechanical and strategic
difficulties associated with the partial solutions canvassed in Part II. Moreover, the
necessary alteration in the language of Rule 14a-4(d) is limited to a single word.
The phrase "unless he has consented to being named in the proxy statement" would
be changed to substitute the word "any" for the word "the". The operative phrase
would then read "unless he has consented to being named in any proxy statement."
We can anticipate the most obvious objection to our proposal, what we call the
"not with those people I won't" position. The argument is that some management
nominees might state that they would not serve as directors, even if elected, if any
dissident nominees also were elected. In our view, this is a make weight argument.
In the face of a dissident campaign for a minority of board seats, the one outcome
of which we are reasonably confident is that management would not nominate direc-
tors who would decline to serve if both they and the dissident nominees were
elected.3 8 Suppose nine "conditional" management nominees-we'll serve only on
the condition that all the dissidents lose-and three dissident nominees are elected
to a twelve person board. If the nine management nominees then decline to serve,
the vacancies would be filled by the three dissident directors.3 9 The result would be,
quite literally, to give complete control to the dissidents. This hardly seems an
optimal strategy for management.
Even were management to pursue such brinkmanship, the. problem can be
handled by a simple piece of disclosure. The conditions under which a director
nominee is willing to serve is obviously material to a shareholder's voting decision.
Any party soliciting proxies for a director that has conditioned his or her willingness
to serve if elected should include those conditions as a part of the proxy statement,
whether the soliciting party .is management or a dissident. Indeed, it is hard to
imagine that such disclosure is not required under current law.4
38. See supra text accompanying note 28. Such a position seems to violate the current text of the
bona fide nominee rule which requires that a nominee on whose behalf proxies are solicited has consented
"to serve if elected." The difference goes to the heart of the real problem at which the bona fide nominee
rule is directed: shareholders being forced to vote for a candidate who may not be the individual who will
actually fill the position. See supra text accompanying note 26.
39. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 142(e) (1991).
40. Current SEC staff practice appears to require that a dissident running a short slate must
disclose that election of the dissident candidates may result in the refusal of elected management nomi-
nees to serve on the board. DIVISION OF CORPORATE FINANCE, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
PROXY REFERENCE MANUAL 33 (1984), discussed in PAUL RICHTER. PROXY CONTEST HANDBOOK
(1989). It does not appear that management nominees are required to disclose the conditions under
which they will not serve if elected, nor is there discussion of why such conditions would not violate the
bona fide nominee rule.
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Our proposed reform of the bona fide nominee rule is quite simple in scope but
potentially far-reaching in effects. By allowing all soliciting parties to include on
their proxy cards the names of any bona fide nominee, our reform would facilitate
efforts by shareholders to participate constructively in the corporate governance
process by seeking minority board representation rather than control. Our hope is
that corporate governance activity in the 1990s takes the constructive turn appro-
priate to an era in which the focus of organizational energy should be on building
structures that work rather than dismantling ones that do not. The present form of
the bona fide nominee rule is an unjustified barrier to that desirable change in the
focus of corporate governance activity.
V. CONCLUSION
The nomination and election of a minority of expert, shareholder-sponsored
directors is a particularly attractive way for shareholders to address long-term
incentive and performance problems within the corporation in a constructive, rather
than confrontational, manner. However, the current proxy regulatory regime
imposes strategic barriers to pursuing a program of constructive engagement. The
bona fide nominee rule forces shareholders to run short slates composed only of their
own nominees, rather than full slates made up of a minority of their own nominees
and a majority of management nominees. As a result, shareholder proposed short
slates may receive majority votes, yet still lose-hardly a result in keeping with an
efficient system of shareholder oversight.
In this article, we have described and formalized the short slate problem,
canvassed the options that are available to shareholders witfiin the existing regula-
tory regime, and proposed a simple regulatory reform that solves the problem. In
the course of its ongoing review of the proxy process, the subject is well worth the
SEC's attention.
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